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SUMMARY 
 
This paper is concerned with security in OSI, and in particular with the 
security features within CCITT X.400.  Some idea is given of how these 
security features can be used to provide secure store-and-forward 
messaging, and some limitations of the security provisions are discussed. 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to describe the security features 
within the 1988 CCITT X.400 Recommendations, [2], and to give an idea of 
how these features may be used to provide a secure store-and-forward 
message handling system.  Certain limitations of these security features 
are also indicated.  All this material can be found in Section 5 of this 
paper. 
 
As an introduction to this discussion, a brief survey to general 
standardisation efforts for OSI security is given.  The work of the main 
international standards committees involved in work on security for OSI 
(i.e. ISO, CCITT and ECMA) can be divided into three main parts.  First 
there is work on underlying techniques, such as:  cryptographic 
algorithms, modes of operation for cryptographic algorithms and peer 
entity authentication mechanisms.  Second there is more general work 
describing how these techniques may be used to provide security in both 
OSI applications and various layers of the OSI model, such as: the OSI 
security architecture, Lower and Upper Layer security models and various 
security frameworks.  These first two areas are very briefly discussed in 
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 below.  The third area of standardisation effort 
includes the X.400 work, and is concerned with specifying how security 
should be provided in specific OSI applications; this is covered in 
Section 4. 
 
Preliminary even to these remarks, in the next section a brief review of 




2.  THE OSI 7-LAYER MODEL 
 
The aim of Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) is to provide a 
standardised means of communication between diverse computer systems.  As 
a basis for the development of OSI standards, ISO have developed a 
Reference Model to partition the problem into discrete layers, and to 
provide a conceptual framework for understanding the complex problems 
involved. 
 
The Reference Model has seven layers; from the 'bottom up' they are as 
follows: 
1.  Physical Layer 
2.  Link Layer 
3.  Network Layer 
4.  Transport Layer 
5.  Session Layer 
6.  Presentation Layer 
7.  Application Layer 
The Reference Model specifies the functionality of each layer and the 
interfaces between adjacent layers.  It also defines methods for 
achieving layer-specific functionality between cooperating computer 
systems. 
 
The lowest three layers (Physical (1), Data Link (2) and Network (3)) are 
concerned with the provision of data transmission.  The Physical Layer 
models the interface of a computer system to the physical medium.  It 
includes such aspects as physical connectors and voltage levels.  The 
Data Link Layer provides a framework around data for transmission by the 
Physical Layer; detection and correction of errors may be performed by 
this layer.  The Network Layer is particularly concerned with routing and 
relaying.  The services offered by the Network Layer to the Transport 
Layer conceal from it the numbers and types of sub-network that may be 
involved in the communication. 
 
The Transport Layer (4) operates end-to-end between computer systems and 
is concerned with Quality of Service.  The Transport Layer is responsible 
for providing the Session Layer with a reliable data transmission 
service. 
 
The Session Layer (5) assumes reliable data transmission services between 
computer systems (i.e. end-to-end communications).  It occupies the area 
between the application-oriented upper layers (6 and 7) and the 'real-
time' data communication environment.  It provides services for the 
management and control of data flow between two computer systems. 
 
The function of the Presentation Layer (6) is to provide a common 
representation of information whilst in transit between computer systems. 
 
The Application Layer (7) provides the communication-based service to end 
users.  The other six layers of the model exist to support and make 
possible the activities that take place at the Application Layer. 
 




3.  OSI SECURITY ACTIVITIES 
 
3.1  Security techniques 
 
Within ISO, work on techniques for security, in particular on 
cryptographic techniques, has been primarily focussed within ISO/IEC/JTC1 
SC20 (and will be continued by its proposed successor SC27).  Outside 
ISO, other work has proceeded within ANSI and the NBS (in the U.S.A.).  
This work can be conveniently divided into three areas:  algorithms (e.g. 
encryption functions, digital signature functions), peer entity 
authentication protocols and key management. 
 
After the failure of attempts to standardise specific encryption 
algorithms, it was decided that ISO would change tack.  Instead, it has 
been decided to adopt the idea of an international register of 
algorithms, through which any encryption algorithm can be given a 
standardised identifier.  The draft proposal ISO DP 9979, [10], caters 
for registering proprietary algorithms, the details of which may remain 
confidential to their owners.  An international standard, ISO 8372, [6], 
specifying modes of use for an arbitrary 64-bit block cipher algorithm 
has also been produced.  A successor to this standard, in the form of a 
draft proposal, ISO DP 10116, [11], generalises this further to 
specifying modes of use for an N-bit block cipher algorithm. 
 
In addition to data confidentiality, a good deal of work has also been 
done within ISO (and other standards bodies) concerning standardising 
algorithms for message authentication, integrity checking and digital 
signature.  A draft international standard now exists, ISO DIS 9797, [9], 
for a data integrity mechanism.  Two standards proposals exist relating 
to digital signature algorithms.  The first is a draft proposal, ISO DP 
10118, [12], specifying possible methods for computing hash functions for 
digital signatures; note that one of the methods described there will 
probably need to be removed in the light of recent work by Coppersmith, 
[4].  The second is a proposal for a signature algorithm for 'short' 
messages, ISO DP 9796, [8]. 
 
In parallel with the current work within ISO on algorithms, efforts have 
also been made to standardise the protocol exchanges involved in 
performing party-to-party authentication.  This has resulted in drafts 
for a multi-part standard. 
 
ISO work on key management is at an early stage of development.  Three 
draft documents exist, entitled:  Cryptographic mechanisms for key 
management: Part 1: Key management overview, Part 2: Key management using 
secret key techniques and Part 3: Key management for public key register.  
It is likely to be some time before any of these documents emerge as 




3.2  Using security mechanisms 
 
Within ISO, the questions of how and where within the OSI model security 
mechanisms are to be used falls primarily within the scope of SC21/WG1, 
together with the layer and application specific Working Groups of SC6 
and SC21.  Work in this area can be divided into three parts, namely:  
security architectures and models, security frameworks and layer specific 
standards. 
 
Most of this work is at a very early stage, and we do not discuss it 
further here.  The main exception is the OSI Security Architecture, ISO 
7498-2, [5], released as an International Standard in 1988.  This 
document covers a number of important topics, including: standardised 
definitions of security terminology and security services, a guide to the 
relationship between security services and mechanisms, an indication of 
which security services are relevant to which layers of the OSI model and 
a short introduction to security management. 
 
 
4.  OSI APPLICATION LAYER SECURITY 
 
We now very briefly consider the effort that has been devoted to 
providing standardised security solutions for specific OSI applications. 
 
The 1988 version of the X.500 CCITT Recommendations on Directory 
Services, [3], and their corresponding ISO draft standards, [7], include 
means to use the Directory Service to provide key management and peer-
entity authentication through storage of user public keys in the 
directory.  The 1992 version of these recommendations is also expected to 
contain detailed provisions for access control to directory entries. 
 
The 1988 versions of the X.400 CCITT Recommendations, [2], include a 
variety of security features making it possible to provide a variety of 
security services for electronic mail.  We discuss these provisions in 
more detail in the next section. 
 
In parallel with the general growth in interest in EDI (Electronic Data 
Interchange), there has also been a very rapid growth in concern 
regarding the security of EDI messages.  For those EDI messages 
transmitted using X.400 networks, use of the X.400 security features may 
be sufficient.  However, for EDI messages sent by other means, or where 
security services are required which cannot be provided using the X.400 
features, EDI may need to be enhanced to incorporate security elements.  
This is an area of current debate. 
 
 
5.  SECURITY FOR X.400 STORE-AND-FORWARD MESSAGING 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
We now consider in more detail security in electronic mail applications, 
with particular reference to the security features in the 1988 versions 
of the CCITT X.400 Recommendations, [2].  We devote the remainder of this 
introduction to a brief review of the fundamental concepts underlying the 
X.400 electronic mail system. 
 
The 1984 version of the X.400 recommendations, [1], defines two basic 
types of entity in a 'store and forward' mail network, namely User Agents 
(UAs) and Message Transfer Agents (MTAs).  UAs originate and receive 
messages on behalf of users.  All messages are sent via one or more MTAs, 
which act as 'store and forward' message nodes.  The set of all MTAs 
collectively form what is known as the Message Transfer Service (MTS). 
 
X.400 is widely used as a generic term for a collection of related 
C.C.I.T.T. Recommendations, including X.400 itself, X.402, X.411, X.413 
and X.420, [2].  The protocols governing communication between pairs of 
MTAs and between a UA and the MTS are defined in X.411.  The protocol 
governing MTAÄMTA communications is often referred to as P1, and the 
UAÄMTA protocol as P3.  The entire collection of UAs and MTAs is referred 
to as the Message Handling System (MHS). 
 
In the 1988 version of the X.400 Recommendations, [2], in fact in X.413, 
a third type of entity is defined, namely a Message Store (MS).  Message 
Stores were not part of the 1984 version of X.400.  In some cases it is 
convenient to only connect a UA to the MTS at very infrequent intervals.  
However MTAs may only store mail for recipient UAs for a short period of 
time.  The role of a MS is to remedy this problem by acting as an 
intermediary between a UA and the MTS, with storage of received messages 
as its primary role.  UAs and MSs are in 1Ä1 correspondence, and an MS 
enables its corresponding UA to obtain summary information about received 
messages without actually retrieving them.  In practice, an MS is likely 
to be co-located either with an MTA or with its corresponding UA.  The 
Message Store Access Protocol (sometimes referred to as P7), governing 
the retrieval of messages by a UA from its corresponding MS, is defined 
in Recommendation X.413.  Note that UAs and MSs are collectively referred 
to as MTS-users, in that they are both end-users of the Message Transfer 
Service. 
 
All the protocols so far discussed, namely those in X.411 and X.413, have 
the role of defining how an object called a message-content is shipped 
from one UA to another.  The form of this content is not constrained by 
X.411 or X.413, and may be one of a number of different types.  It is 
carried transparently by the MTS.  One such type is defined in X.420; 
this type is defined as suitable for use in Inter-Personal Messaging 
applications.  Other content types may be defined for different 
applications such as Electronic Data Interchange (EDI). 
 
Finally note that the set of parameters defined in X.411 and X.413, which 
accompany the message content when it is transferred from one MHS entity 
to another, are often referred to as the message envelope.  This is 
because in many ways these parameters have roles analogous to those of 
the addressing and franking information to be found on the  envelope of 
conventional paper mail.  However, in X.400 the form and content of the 
envelope depends on the type of entities which are involved in the 
transfer, e.g. submission envelopes are used to transfer from a UA to the 
MTS and delivery envelopes are used to transfer from the MTS to a UA. 
 
 
5.2  Security services 
 
Before describing electronic mail security services in detail, it is 
useful to consider what threats these services are intended to counter.  
Possible threats to electronic mail systems include:  masquerade, message 
replay/re-sequencing, modification of message information, denial of 
service, leakage of information and repudiation.  It is not possible to 
address all these threats from within a message handling application.  
For example information leakage will take place if it is possible to 
monitor the volumes of traffic going from one point in the network to 
another, even if all the message contents are encrypted.  Prevention of 
this leakage requires the provision of security services in the lower 
layers of the OSI stack, which is beyond the scope of application 
services. 
 
There are a considerable number of different security services that could 
be provided within an electronic mail system.  Such services may 
conveniently be divided into two classes, namely MTS-user to MTS-user 
services and MTS services (note that this is non-standard terminology). 
 
MTS-user to MTS-user services are those provided from one MTSÄuser (i.e. 
a UA or an MS) to another, without active participation by the MTS.  Such 
services include:  Message origin authentication, Content 
confidentiality, Content integrity, Message sequence integrity and Non-
repudiation of origin. 
 
MTS security services are those provided which involve active 
participation by the MTS.  Such services include:  Secure access control 
to the MTS and between MTAs, Report origin authentication, Proof of 
delivery, Probe origin authentication, Proof of submission, Non-
repudiation of submission, Non-repudiation of delivery and Message 
security labelling. 
 
The service names used here are those given in the X.400 Recommendations.  
These do not correspond precisely with the names used in ISO 7498-2, the 
OSI security architecture, [5].  This is partly because the OSI security 
architecture does not mention all the services relevant to electronic 
mail, and partly because the documents were developed in parallel. 
 
 
5.3  Approaches to providing security 
 
In order to provide security services for the message content it is 
normally necessary to transmit with the message a number of 'security 
parameters', e.g. encrypted keys and authentication checks.  These 
security parameters can either be transmitted in the message envelope or 
as part of a (specially formatted) message content, or both.  The choice 
of location for the security parameters not only has important system 
ramifications, but can also affect the type of security service which may 
be provided. 
 
If security services are required for X.400-1984, or other electronic 
mail systems without built in security features, then there is no 
alternative but to put the security parameters in the message content.  
The same is true for any heterogeneous mail systems, even if they 
individually incorporate security features.  Examples of electronic mail 
systems in which all the security parameters are in the message content 
are provided by the SDNS and IAB Internet mail security proposals.  
However, security parameters within the message content cannot be used to 
provide MTS security services. 
 
A distinct feature of the 1988 X.400 Recommendations is that the message 
envelope is used to transfer security parameters, and not the message 
content.  The inclusion of the security parameters in the message 
envelope enables the provision of MTS security services.  However, it 
does make the provision of certain MTS-user to MTS-user services rather 
problematical, especially if Message Stores are used. 
 
 
5.4  Security mechanisms 
 
Before we consider the security mechanisms described in the X.400 
Recommendations, we need to consider the provision of cryptographic key 
management, a fundamental requirement for the provision of communications 
security services.  Key management for the X.400 security facilities is 
achieved by use of the directory authentication service specified in 
C.C.I.T.T. Recommendation X.509, [3].  This key management system is 
based on the use of public key cryptosystems for digital signature and 
data encryption.  Recommendation X.509, [3], allows public keys to be 
stored in user directory entries. 
 
5.4.1  Certificates 
 
Since the directory service (and communications with it) may not be 
trusted, means need to be provided for users to verify public keys read 
from the directory.  This is provided for by the use of data structures 
called certificates, which we now briefly describe. 
 
In order to set up a key management system for X.400, every user who 
wants to use security services must first exchange public keys with an 
off-line entity called a Certification Authority (CA).  Each user must 
trust the CA which they appoint to act on their behalf.  The CA gives the 
user a copy of its public key (each CA has its own public key/secret key 
pair), and is given in return a copy of the user's public key (each user 
must also equip themselves with a key pair).  The CA then signs a copy of 
the user's public key, together with the user's name and the period of 
validity of the key, using the CA's secret key.  This forms a certificate 
and is actually what is put in the directory.  Any other user which has a 
trusted copy of this CA's public key can then check the validity of the 
certificate, and thereby obtain a verified copy of the user's public key. 
 
The scheme so far described does not cover the situation where two users 
are served by different CAs.  To cover this possibility, one CA may 
generate a certificate for another CA's public key; such certificates are 
called 'cross-certificates'.  If user A has CA X, and user B has CA Y, 
then if A is given a cross-certificate containing Y's public key signed 
by X, then A can obtain a verified copy of Y's public key.  Once it has 
this key, A can then check B's certificate.  Such cross-certificates can 
be made into chains called 'certification paths'. 
 
5.4.2  Tokens 
 
Virtually all the security services built into the X.400 Recommendations 
make use of a cryptographic construct called a token.  Tokens are always 
formed for a single recipient.  A token consists of a series of data 
fields with a digital signature appended, this signature being computed 
as a function of all the data fields in the token (using the originator's 
secret key).  These data fields include:  recipient-name, date/time of 
generation, a field called 'signed-data' and a field called 'encrypted-
data'.  The information within the encrypted-data field is enciphered 
using the public key of the intended recipient of the token (prior to 
computation of the signature). 
 
One form of token is called a message-token, and is used in the provision 
of all the MTS-user to MTS-user security services.  Hence, if a message 
requires such services, then a message-token is sent as one parameter 
within the message envelope.  The precise contents of the signed-data and 
encrypted-data fields within the message-token depend on which selection 
of security services is required.  However, whichever services are 
required, the presence of these data within the token prevents them from 
being changed and/or repudiated, since the token has been signed with the 
originator's secret key. 
 
In a message-token, the encrypted-data field may be used to contain any 
of the following items:  a cryptographic key (used to encrypt the message 
content if content confidentiality is required), a content integrity 
check (used in the provision of content integrity), a message security 
label, a content integrity key (used to compute the content integrity 
check) and a message sequence number (used in the provision of message 
sequence integrity).  The signed-data field may be used to contain any of 
the following items:  a content integrity check (used in the provision of 
content integrity), a message security label, a message sequence number 
(used in the provision of message sequence integrity) and a proof of 
delivery request. 
 
The proof of delivery and non-repudiation of delivery services are 
slightly different from other MTS-user to MTS-user services in that they 
are provided by the message recipient to the message originator.  If a 
message is received containing a proof of delivery request (in the 
signed-data field of the message token) then the recipient should compute 
and return to the MTS a signed version of the (unencrypted) message 
content together with other delivery related parameters; however, the 
recipient cannot be forced to provide this proof.  This signature, 
computed using the recipient's secret key, is returned to the message 
originator within the delivery report.  The message originator then uses 
this signature to provide the required service(s). 
 
Means are also provided within X.411 and X.413 for a pair of MHS entities 
to perform peer-entity-authentication prior to opening a connection for 
the exchange of messages.  This protocol exchange again involves the use 
of tokens.  For systems providing Mandatory Access Control services, all 
messages and entities can be assigned security labels.  These labels can 
be tied to message contents by their inclusion in either the encrypted-
data or signed-data fields of the message token (depending on whether or 
not the label itself is confidential).  Inter-entity connections can also 




5.5  Limitations of security in X.400-1988 
 
We conclude by very briefly mentioning three important limitations of the 
current X.400 Recommendations.  A more detailed discussion of these 
shortcomings can be found in [13]. 
 
First, proof of delivery to a UA is not available when an MS is used.  
Because of the way the protocols operate, the proof of delivery must be 
generated at the time the message is delivered by the MTS to the MTS-
user.  If this MTS-user is an MS, then it must generate and sign the 
delivery proof, and not the end user.  The message originator then has no 
proof that the message was ever delivered to the recipient UA, only to 
the MS belonging to the recipient UA. 
 
Second, proof of delivery by an MS is not possible if the message content 
is encrypted.  The proof of delivery must be computed using the 
unencrypted message content, which will not be available to the MS 
(unless the MS is equipped with the UA's secret key). 
 
Third, the specified form of token may allow the 'theft' of message 
content by third parties even when the content is encrypted.  In certain 
circumstances this can be achieved by a third party replacing the 
signature on the token of an intercepted message by this third party's 
own signature.  This arises because the signature on the token is 
computed after the secret data (in the encrypted-data field) is 
enciphered.  The problem would not arise if the order of these two 
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